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Editors' Summary 
THE  BROOKINGS  PANEL  on Economic  Activity  held  its  sixty-sixth 
conference  in Washington,  D.C.,  on September  3 and 4,  1998.  This 
issue of Brookings Papers includes the papers, reports, and discussions 
presented  at the conference.  The  first paper analyzes  the East  Asian 
currency crisis,  examining its predictability and causes,  and evaluating 
the policy  responses  that were  made.  The  second  provides  a modern 
version  of  the Keynesian  liquidity  trap as  an explanation  of  Japan's 
deepening  recession  and  offers  an unorthodox  policy  prescription: 
promised  inflation.  The third paper examines  the roles  played  by de- 
mographics and tropical geography  in perpetuating poverty  in Africa. 
The  first report reviews  the performance  of  conventional  models  of 
inflation during the recent period of  outstanding  macroeconomic  per- 
formance  in the U.S.  economy.  And the concluding  report examines 
Japan's  current banking  problem,  tracing  its  origins  to  the  postwar 
evolution  of the Japanese economic  and financial systems. 
THE  BELIEF  that the increasing  globalization  of commodity  and cap- 
ital markets and the opening  of developing  economies  would usher in 
an era of economic  prosperity and stability  has been repeatedly  chal- 
lenged by major economic  crises during the past twenty years. Currency 
and banking crises have been abundant. Since  1975,  more than eighty- 
seven  countries  have  experienced  currency  depreciations  of  over  25 
percent in a single  year; and on an estimated  sixty-nine  occasions,  the 
entire banking system of a country had zero or negative  net worth. At 
least  in hindsight,  the proximate  causes  usually  seem  apparent. The 
recent Asian crisis is a different matter. It occurred in the fastest grow- 
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ing region of the world,  and many of the antecedents of other collapses 
were not present. Moreover,  the crisis was especially  virulent: the larg- 
est  international rescue  package  in history  did not stem the problem, 
and even today the outlook  for many of the economies  in the region is 
poor.  In the first paper of this issue,  Jason Furman and Joseph Stiglitz 
examine the East Asian experience,  taking a fresh look at the causes of 
currency and financial crises,  the extent to which they can be foreseen, 
the appropriate policy  responses,  and the costs  and benefits  of  global 
integration. 
The authors observe  that there has been a remarkable shift in senti- 
ment about the East Asian  economies.  Before  the collapse,  they were 
widely  admired.  Their outward orientation,  high rates of  saving,  and 
effective  governments  were all cited as reasons for their extraordinary 
growth and stability.  Since  the crisis,  they have been castigated  for a 
host  of  deficiencies,  including  mismanaged  exchange  rates,  lack  of 
transparency,  wasteful  investment,  and current account  deficits.  The 
authors  note  that  many  of  the  features  earlier  identified  as  keys  to 
success  are  now  seen  as  causes  of  failure.  For  example,  the  close 
relationship between  government and business,  which some viewed  as 
coordination  that efficiently  handled information,  is now  seen  as col- 
lusion  that fosters  political  cronyism  and inefficient  allocation  of  re- 
sources.  In retrospect,  some  have come  to believe  that the crisis  was 
inevitable,  despite the fact that these economies  had weathered earlier 
shocks,  such as OPEC, far better than other, seemingly  less vulnerable 
economies. 
All  agree that the East Asian  economies  had achieved  remarkable 
growth.  The  authors report that between  1966  and  1996,  per capita 
income  grew  at average  annual rates of  over  4 percent in Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  and Thailand,  and over  7  percent  in Korea; GDP  grew  in 
every year in Indonesia and Thailand and fell in only one year in Korea 
and Malaysia.  Whereas in 1975 roughly six out of ten East Asians were 
in  poverty,  that fraction  had fallen  to  two  out of  ten  by  1995.  Any 
explanation of the current crisis that blames a fixed characteristic of the 
East Asian system,  such as directed lending,  must also explain how the 
system  did so well  in the past. 
The  authors believe  that the  most  plausible  reconciliation  of  past 
with present involves  both a changed environment that made past pol- 
icies less appropriate and policy changes that made these countries more William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xi 
vulnerable.  They emphasize that integration with world capital markets 
and increased  capital flows  exposed  the developing  countries to inter- 
national financial shocks and the changing sentiments of foreign inves- 
tors.  They  also believe  that internal policies,  in both government  and 
the private sector, that had served well at earlier stages of development 
were less  successful  in the larger and more complicated economies  that 
emerged.  In Korea, for example,  heavy reliance on debt may have been 
a factor in rapid growth, but it left companies vulnerable to a slowdown. 
In the past,  the government had mitigated the risks of this leverage  by 
absorbing shocks through directed credit and other mechanisms.  More 
recently,  the government has been both less able and less willing  to do 
so.  They also argue that financial liberalization  without commensurate 
strengthening of regulation and supervision  was an important factor in 
the crisis,  a view  they trace to a pathbreaking study of  Chile's  1982 
crisis by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro. 
Furman and Stiglitz  consider  what the East Asian  countries  might 
have done differently  and what they can do in the future. In retrospect, 
some macroeconomic  mistakes are apparent. They reason that govern- 
ments should have been aware of the systemic risk to the economy  from 
the high  level  of  private borrowing  from abroad, and discuss  several 
sources  of  discrepancy  between  the private and social  risk.  Most  im- 
portant, borrowers do not take account of  the social  risk they impose 
when  they  issue  short-term foreign-denominated  debt to lenders who 
expect a bailout in the event of a systemic failure. The authors document 
the enormity of capital flows  into the developing  countries during the 
period, note the difficulty of distinguishing  temporary from permanent 
flows,  and report evidence  that external factors explain a large fraction 
of the variations in flows.  They note that even  if governments  recog- 
nized the risks, in an environment of liberalization they had few instru- 
ments with which to limit the size of the flows. 
The  authors argue that the East  Asian  countries  were  in  a  "fixed 
exchange  rate bind"  that severely  limited  their  ability  to  deal  with 
current account  deficits.  Capital  inflows  led  to  the  accumulation  of 
reserves which,  when sterilized,  raised interest rates. In Thailand,  for 
example,  short-term rates increased 4 percent relative to U.S.  rates in 
1996. With exchange rates expected to remain fixed, the higher interest 
rates increased short-term debt inflows,  which,  in turn, led to booming 
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able sectors.  This left the economies  extremely  vulnerable,  with asset 
price bubbles and both currency and maturity mismatches between their 
assets and liabilities. 
Furman and Stiglitz  argue that there was  no easy  way  out of  this 
bind. Widening the exchange  pegs would have accomplished  little,  and 
abandoning the pegs altogether in favor of a flexible rate carried its own 
risks. Given a reasoned commitment to maintaining the exchange  rate, 
few  policy  choices  were  left.  Tighter money  might have  reduced in- 
vestment  and the  need  to  borrow  from  abroad but would  also  have 
increased  incentives  to finance with unhedged short-term debt.  Fiscal 
policies  could  have been even  tighter than they were,  but the authors 
find it hard to fault governments already running surpluses,  when more 
public  infrastructure was needed  and private saving  was  already very 
high.  In the financial arena, they reason that well-designed  regulations 
might have  reduced banks'  exposure  but would  not have prevented  a 
shift  to  borrowing  by  other sectors.  They  do  suggest,  however,  that 
broad restraints on  international  capital  flows,  especially  short-term 
flows,  could have complemented closer regulation of domestic financial 
markets, and so reduced risks. 
The authors test their contention  that the East Asian countries were 
pursing reasonable macroeconomic  policies  by examining  whether the 
crisis could have been predicted.  As previous analysts have noted,  the 
East Asian  crisis  does  not fit theoretical  models  that stress either per- 
sistent government deficits or the temptation of governments to devalue 
in order to expand output, since neither factor was important. Overval- 
uation of  the real exchange  rate was  arguably a problem,  since  many 
countries were effectively  tied to the dollar when it appreciated sharply 
against the yen.  But the authors find no systematic connection  between 
overvaluation and crisis.  Indeed, they find that by some measures Korea 
was actually undervalued. 
Furman and Stiglitz  also  examine  the predictions  of  more eclectic 
empirical  models  that incorporate longer  lists  of  macroeconomic  and 
financial  variables.  They  find  that  a  model  by  Jeffrey  Frankel  and 
Andrew Rose featuring variables such as foreign direct investment as a 
fraction of total debt and the ratio of reserves to imports actually gives 
the East Asian  countries  a below  average  probability  of  crisis.  They 
also  show  that  a model  due  to  Asli  Demirgtii-Kunt  and  Enrica 
Detragiache  predicts  less  than one  banking crisis  in twenty  years for William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xiii 
each of the East Asian countries.  According to this model,  even know- 
ing in advance the extent of the depreciations  and recessions  in 1997, 
one would  have been very worried about banking crises  only  in Indo- 
nesia  and Thailand.  The  authors also  examine  the  usefulness  of  the 
leading  indicator  model  developed  by  Graciela  Kaminsky,  Saul  Li- 
zondo,  and Carmen Reinhart. They  observe  that it has a bias  toward 
predicting crises  in regions  with a history of  stability,  like East Asia. 
While it predicts the East Asian crisis somewhat better than the previous 
two models,  it does  so at the cost of predicting many crises that never 
happened. 
The  authors are not  surprised by the general failure  to predict the 
East Asian  crisis  using  historical  data,  noting  that the region's  econ- 
omies had virtually none of the flaws that were common in Latin Amer- 
ica,  which  has  provided  most  of  the  historical  experience.  Because 
some  have  suggested  that the recent Mexican  crisis  provides  a more 
useful  antecedent,  Furman and  Stiglitz  also  examine  the  predictive 
power of the "Tequila crisis,"  relying on the analysis of Jeffrey Sachs, 
Aaron Tornell,  and Andres Velasco.  They find virtually no relationship 
between  the factors found important in understanding Mexico  and the 
depth and scope  of  the crises  in East Asia.  Using  that model  in the 
summer of  1997 would have provided no guidance. 
Many observers have identified excessive  short-term borrowing, with 
the resulting  risk of  capital  flight,  as a key  factor in the onset  of  the 
East  Asian  crisis.  Furman and  Stiglitz  report that  studies  based  on 
earlier experience  are inconclusive  about the effects  of short-term bor- 
rowing on currency or banking crises,  but they find that short-term debt 
relative  to reserves  would  have  done a remarkable job  of  forecasting 
the  events  of  1997.  In  a  sample  of  forty-two  developing  countries, 
eleven  had short-term debt in excess  of reserves; of these,  all but three 
faced severe difficulties  in 1997.  The authors note that any decision  to 
constrain short-term borrowing should balance the costs  of interfering 
against the benefits of reduced crisis exposure.  But they reason that for 
the East Asian economies,  the costs  of interfering were probably low. 
Various distortions artificially lowered the cost of short-term debt, and 
the high rates of domestic saving,  augmented by capital inflows follow- 
ing  liberalization,  may well  have  driven returns to  investment  lower 
than private investors expected.  They also believe  that policies  to inhibit 
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gested.  They cite the Chilean experience,  where it is generally acknowl- 
edged  that the reserve  requirement on  short-term capital  inflows  has 
significantly  lengthened  the maturity of  inflows  without  reducing  the 
inflow  of  valuable  long-term  capital,  and they  suggest  that tax-based 
policies  might work even better. 
Another  popular  explanation  for  the  East  Asian  crisis  is  lack  of 
transparency, a term that loosely  covers corruption, lack of accounting 
standards, and the unavailability  of  accurate information about the fi- 
nancial  condition  of  firms,  financial  institutions,  and  governments 
themselves.  The authors observe that this explanation permits investors 
to  blame  the  affected  countries  rather than either  their own  lack  of 
foresight  or the liberalization  of  financial and capital markets.  It also 
suggests  that the corrective is internal reform by the affected countries, 
not restraints on international markets or actions by the developed  na- 
tions,  such as the creation of an international lender of last resort. The 
irony,  the  authors note,  is  that in focusing  attention  on  the  internal 
weaknesses  of the affected economies,  policymakers may have contrib- 
uted to the severity  of the downturn. 
Little  analysis  has so far been offered  of how  lack of transparency 
would affect a currency or banking crisis; Furman and Stiglitz  attempt 
to fill the gap. They observe,  first, that if lack of transparency contri- 
buted to the crisis,  the East Asian  economies  must have become  less 
transparent, or their need for transparency must have  increased,  or it 
was not transparency per se that mattered, but news about it. They find 
no such news,  since the lack of transparency was already widely known. 
Nor  do  they  find clear  evidence  of  changing  transparency.  They  ac- 
knowledge  that the integration of world capital markets may have in- 
creased the need for transparency in the years before the crisis.  But in 
light of the large increase in capital flows and decline  in risk premiums 
that occurred,  they  reject  the  notion  that international  investors  had 
raised  their standards for information  disclosure  and accuracy.  They 
also find only  mixed  evidence  on whether corruption had increased in 
the economies  of the region. 
To assess the effect of transparency on vulnerability,  the authors turn 
to the burgeoning work on the economics  of information.  Much of this 
research has illuminated the ways in which better information may lead 
to improved resource allocation.  Furman and Stiglitz  observe that lack 
of transparency should generally  affect  the variance but not the mean William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perty  xv 
of people's  expectations,  and that when people  know  less,  any infor- 
mation  will  have  a larger effect  on their beliefs.  These  observations 
suggest  one way in which a lack of transparency might be a factor in a 
crisis.  With little transparency, for example,  a downturn might lead to 
large downward revisions  in estimates  of fundamentals,  sharply low- 
ering asset prices,  raising risk premiums, and exacerbating the decline. 
Relatedly,  a shock that ought to affect the fundamentals of some firms 
but not others may produce widespread credit rationing because markets 
cannot distinguish  the winners  from the losers.  Although  the authors 
believe  that lack of transparency probably contributed to the downturns 
in East Asia through these channels,  they note that the effects  of trans- 
parency on credit rationing and market volatility  in general are uncer- 
tain,  and provide several models  to illustrate this point. 
Furman and Stiglitz note that the ambiguity about the value of greater 
transparency is not just a theoretical curiosity.  In the United States and 
elsewhere,  bank regulators resist mark-to-market accounting  and cen- 
tral banks provide  only  limited  information  about the bases  for their 
decisions,  evidently  convinced  that too much transparency may not be 
a good  thing.  But the authors believe  that the thinness  of  markets in 
developing  economies  exacerbates  the information problem and agree 
that these countries should improve their transparency. In the East Asian 
crisis,  lack of transparency had clear costs: the market knew that some 
firms were  weak,  but could  not tell  which  these  were.  As  a result,  it 
restricted the supply of capital to all firms, exacerbating the downturn. 
One of the most contentious  issues  in the East Asian financial crisis 
was how far to raise interest rates in an attempt to stabilize  currencies. 
The authors note that both large exchange  rate depreciations  and long- 
lasting  increases  in  real  interest  rates  are costly.  However,  whether 
temporarily higher interest rates can permanently strengthen exchange 
rates and whether higher interest rates could actually depreciate rather 
than support a currency in the short run are important open questions 
which they examine both theoretically  and empirically.  They first con- 
sider  the  common  assumption  that raising  today's  interest  rate will 
strengthen today's  exchange  rate.  The  standard model  assumes  that 
markets equilibriate the expected returns from holding the domestic and 
foreign currency. Hence expectations  about the future course of interest 
rates tie  today's  exchange  rate to  its  expected  long-term  value.  An 
increase in the interest rate attracts foreign  funds,  and if the expected xvi  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
future exchange  rate remains unchanged,  this appreciates today's  ex- 
change rate. If raising interest rates is expected to lower the future price 
level,  as is generally  assumed,  it also  strengthens the expected  future 
exchange  rate, and thus adds to the current appreciation. 
But the authors note that an increase in interest rates could actually 
lower  the long-run value  of the currency by decreasing  investment  or 
reducing exports.  In such circumstances,  the effect  of the interest rate 
increase  on today's  exchange  rate is ambiguous.  Furthermore, higher 
interest rates could  reduce the expected  exchange  rate by raising  the 
risk of default for countries in crisis.  The authors emphasize  that even 
if these  effects  do not lead to a perverse exchange  rate response,  the 
rate increase needed to prevent or reverse a large depreciation may be 
huge.  For example,  an investor anticipating the actual depreciation of 
the Indonesian rupiah between July 1, 1997 and January 30,  1998 would 
have  stayed  in rupiah only  for a 1,700  percent annualized return sus- 
tained over  seven  months.  The  sheer magnitude  of  the rate increases 
required to  stabilize  the currency makes prospects  for a perverse  re- 
sponse  more likely. 
In the  standard  analysis,  a temporary  increase  in  interest  rates 
strengthens the exchange  rate temporarily; the exchange  rate reverts to 
its  long-run  path  when  interest  rates  return to  initial  levels,  except 
insofar as the temporary increase changes  the long-run equilibrium.  A 
temporary increase  in rates could  offset  a temporary shock,  but that 
would  simply  avoid  a temporary devaluation.  Most policymakers  ap- 
pear to have something different in mind: a temporary increase in rates 
as  an effective  response  to  a permanent  shock.  The  authors discuss 
three mechanisms  that could give  this result: buying time for reforms, 
signaling,  and multiple equilibria.  Buying time to institute reforms that 
will strengthen the exchange rate is a common rationale for higher rates. 
But the authors reason that if the reforms were credible,  there would 
be no need to raise rates. The need to raise rates implies that the reforms 
are not credible,  and may even  signal  the government's  worry about 
their credibility.  The authors believe  that the effect  of reforms on the 
expected  future exchange  rate is  probably  as  much  a matter of  psy- 
chology  as of economics.  They  are skeptical  of the ability of  govern- 
ment officials  to predict market psychology  and critical of the insuffi- 
cient  attention paid by the rescue  packages  to likely  market reactions 
and the possibility  of  capital flight.  They  see  a stronger argument for William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xvii 
not tightening fiscal policies in the East Asian economies. In these 
economies, which had been pursuing  prudent  fiscal policies and where 
aggregate demand and supply were roughly in balance, a fiscal con- 
traction would accentuate the downturn, increase the probability of 
bankruptcy  and  uncertainty  about  the future,  and  thus  further  depreciate 
the future  equilibrium  exchange rate. 
Furman  and  Stiglitz contend  that  the strongest  case for a high interest 
rate policy is that it may signal greater  resolve to pursue  low inflation. 
However, they point out a number of ambiguities and subtleties in 
signaling mechanisms. First, strong  and painful policy actions may be 
interpreted  as a sign of serious economic maladies, depressing  the pri- 
vate sector's expectations. Second, for a signal to be effective, it must 
be costly, or else the monetary  authority  would signal its resolve at all 
times. But third, if the costs of signaling are too high they will not be 
credible, because no one will believe that they will be sustained. The 
authors note that countries that already have a reputation  for good 
macroeconomic  policies are  likely to receive less benefit  from  signaling 
because their resolve is less  in question. On these grounds, a high 
interest  policy would be less effective in East Asia than it was in Latin 
America. 
Multiple equilibria  models provide another  mechanism  by which a 
temporary  policy action might change the long-run equilibrium  of an 
economy. In this context, the authors  emphasize  the potential  for high 
interest  rates to affect the economy adversely  by their  effects on finan- 
cial markets  and  the condition  of banks  and  firms. They discuss several 
channels  by which temporary  interest  rate increases  could permanently 
weaken  exchange  rates:  eroding  the net  worth  of both  debtors  and  banks; 
increasing  the probability  of default  and  the perception  of risk, and  thus 
promoting  capital  flight;  increasing  bankruptcies,  and  so disrupting  both 
output  and investment;  encouraging  gambling  and looting behavior  by 
firms  and  financial  institutions,  by eroding  their  net worth;  and  causing 
credit constraints  by worsening  balance sheets. 
The authors  reason that these factors shift in the aggregate supply 
curve, reinforcing  a reduction  in aggregate  demand  and amplifying  the 
reductions  in employment, which, in turn, further  damage firms and 
exacerbate  the supply-side effects. Moreover, they suggest that these 
effects are likely to persist long after interest rates have returned  to 
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raising  interest rates is more likely  to lead to a "bad"  low  exchange 
rate equilibrium than to a "good"  high exchange rate equilibrium. They 
recognize,  however,  that the occurrence of such a bad equilibrium will 
depend on the particular circumstances.  In some cases,  temporary in- 
terest rate increases  could  permanently  strengthen the exchange  rate. 
In Latin America,  for example,  where  firms were  not highly  in debt 
and most debt was long term, higher interest rates may have helped to 
stabilize  currencies.  But in East Asia the opposite conditions prevailed. 
Given  the importance of the issues  and the theoretical  ambiguities, 
it is surprising how little empirical analysis  there has been on the suc- 
cess  of temporary monetary restraint in defending  currencies.  The au- 
thors report on two studies involving  a significant number of observa- 
tions.  One  finds no evidence  that tighter monetary policy  affects  the 
success  of  speculative  attacks.  The  other finds that tighter monetary 
policy  increases the probability of a successful  recovery of the currency 
by about 10 percent when all observations  are included,  but lowers the 
probability of success by about the same amount for countries that suffer 
banking and currency crises,  such as those in East Asia. 
The authors also  provide  their own evidence:  a detailed  discussion 
of  the  contrast between  the  Brazilian  and Indonesian  experiences  in 
1997  and a regression  analysis  of high interest rate policies  in devel- 
oping economies.  In both Indonesia and Brazil,  high interest rates ini- 
tially  prevented the currency from depreciating,  but the eventual  out- 
comes  were quite different.  In Brazil,  interest rates were brought back 
down to precrisis levels  after about two months,  and the exchange  rate 
maintained  its  trajectory.  But  when  Indonesian  authorities  began  to 
lower  interest  rates  gradually,  the  exchange  rate plummeted.  These 
results are not easy to rationalize with standard models-Brazil  looked 
more vulnerable  than Indonesia  in all of  the crisis  prediction  models 
reviewed  by  the  authors,  and most  estimates  suggest  that the  initial 
exchange  rate was more overvalued.  Nevertheless,  Brazil appears to be 
a  prime  candidate  for  the  signaling  model,  with  high  interest  rates 
indicating the government's  willingness  to take costly  measures to sus- 
tain  its  crawling  peg.  By  contrast,  Indonesia's  monetary  policy  had 
been more prudent, so that raising rates provided little new information. 
The Indonesian economy  was also much more vulnerable to high inter- 
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interest rate increase was probably to weaken rather than to strengthen 
the equilibrium exchange  rate. 
The  regression  analysis  uses  thirteen episodes  of  abrupt but brief 
increases  in interest rates in nine emerging  market economies  between 
January 1992 and June 1998. The authors presume these were instances 
of  the authorities attempting to defend  the currency.  In general,  they 
find that higher interest rates are associated with depreciation,  although 
the  exact  results  vary  with  the  specification  used,  and the  effect  is 
generally  larger in lower  inflation countries.  They  recognize  that as- 
cribing a causal interpretation to these results is risky,  given the endo- 
geneity of policy,  and that the effect  of lower inflation is indistinguish- 
able from that of not being a Latin American country. But they note that 
the results are consistent with the theoretical models they describe and 
with their own interpretation  of the differences between Brazil and Indo- 
nesia. At the very least, they question the presumption prevalent in some 
policy circles that increasing interest rates is an effective mechanism in a 
crisis, particularly  for low-inflation countries, such as those in East Asia. 
While financial markets in several of the affected  East Asian coun- 
tries  have  stabilized  in  past  months,  most  of  these  economies  have 
moved into deep recessions,  if not depressions.  Many of the issues that 
confronted policymakers  at the onset  of the crisis  remain.  One lesson 
is  that crises  differ.  In the  authors'  view,  the  East Asian  crisis  was 
largely the result of private decisions  gone wrong, rather  than misguided 
macroeconomic  policies,  as  in  previous  crises  in  other  parts of  the 
world.  In part this  was  simply  a  matter of  miscalculation,  both  by 
industrial country lenders and East Asian borrowers; in part it reflected 
features of the financial system that gave rise to significant differences 
between private and social  risk. Existing  models  based on other crises 
did not predict this one.  But high levels  of  short-term debt relative to 
reserves appear to have greatly increased a country's vulnerability.  This 
suggests  a potential value for policies  that reduce dependence on short- 
term foreign  borrowing.  As  a general  lesson,  the  authors warn that 
rapid financial  liberalization  without  corresponding  improvements  in 
transparency, regulation, and financial infrastructure is risky. They sug- 
gest that, even with hindsight,  there is no easy  answer to how best to 
respond to a crisis and conclude that no single policy will be appropriate 
for all countries in all circumstances. xx  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
AFTER  A  DECADE  in  which  average  growth  exceeded  3.5  percent 
and real growth in no year fell  as low  as 2 percent,  Japan's economic 
performance  has been  dismal  since  1991.  GDP  growth has averaged 
less than 1.5 percent,  and output actually fell  during 1998 and is fore- 
cast to continue to decline  in 1999. Japan is the world's  second largest 
economy.  Its economic  malaise  not only  threatens the prospects  for 
recovery  in the rest of Asia but endangers economic  expansion  around 
the globe.  Japanese policymakers  have been struggling,  with little suc- 
cess,  to  stimulate  the economy.  Expansionary  fiscal  policy  has been 
politically  difficult to enact, and many are skeptical that even the recent 
packages  will  be  sufficient.  Monetary policy,  widely  regarded as the 
most effective  and readily available tool for stimulating aggregate de- 
mand,  appears hamstrung.  With short-term rates below  1 percent for 
several years and now only fractionally  above zero,  the Bank of Japan 
arguably  has  little  room  to  do  more.  This  situation  is  distressingly 
reminiscent  of the United  States and other Western economies  during 
the  Great Depression,  which  many believe  involved  a liquidity  trap: 
monetary policy  was  ineffective  because  nominal  interest rates could 
not be driven any lower. In the second paper of this issue, Paul Krugman 
revisits the liquidity trap, modernizes its theoretical basis,  and proposes 
an innovative  monetary policy  to help Japan escape  the trap. 
Krugman begins with a series of stylized theoretical models designed 
to illuminate the essential  elements  of a liquidity trap. His objective  is 
to provide a rigorous theoretical underpinning for the phenomenon that 
is not vulnerable to contemporary criticisms  of Keynesian  analysis.  In 
particular, his models  are explicitly  intertemporal and assume rational 
expectations.  He also adds features not present in earlier models,  allow- 
ing for foreign  trade and capital  mobility  and incorporating financial 
intermediaries,  thereby  allowing  a distinction  between  currency  and 
reserves and broader measures of money and credit. In all these models, 
of course,  the nominal rate on money  is zero,  providing  a floor to the 
rate on bonds.  At a zero rate, the public is willing  to exchange  bonds 
for any amount of money  injected into the system. 
Krugman begins  with a flexible  price model,  demonstrating that the 
existence  of  a liquidity  trap does  not  depend  on  price  stickiness  as 
frequently assumed in Keynesian analysis.  The simplest model is a one- 
good,  endowment  economy  with a representative agent.  At the begin- 
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nominal  interest.  The central bank can engage  in open market opera- 
tions,  buying or selling  bonds for cash.  After completing  capital trans- 
actions,  individuals go to the market to buy the consumption good,  but 
their purchases are "cash  in advance,"  constrained to be no more than 
the  quantity  of  money  that they  hold.  Since  the  model  is  explicitly 
intertemporal,  in equilibrium  individuals  must be  content,  given  the 
nominal  interest rate today and expected  price levels  and endowment 
income  in  the  future,  to  consume  the  actual endowments  period  by 
period.  Since  the endowments  are exogenous,  the equilibrium real in- 
terest rate depends simply on individuals'  utility functions  and rates of 
time preference-the  real rate is the sum of  the rate of  decline  (with 
growing  consumption)  of  marginal  utility  and the  pure rate of  time 
preference.  It follows  that the time path of the money supply can only 
affect the time path of prices and nominal interest rates. For example, 
if  endowments  are constant  from  tomorrow  forward,  all  future real 
interest rates will  equal the rate of time preference,  and if the money 
supply is held constant,  so is the price level.  With zero inflation in the 
future, the nominal rate will  equal the real rate. 
Given a constant future money supply,  consider what would happen 
with alternative money  supplies  in the first period.  So long as equilib- 
rium nominal  rates  are positive,  individuals  will  hold  exactly  the 
amount of money  necessary  to purchase the first period's  endowment; 
they  would  be  foolish  to  hold  more money  than they  need  for their 
purchases,  given  the opportunity to invest  at a positive  rate. Doubling 
the  first period's  money  supply  will  double  the  price  level  for  one 
period.  Consumers  will  expect  a return to the future (constant)  price 
level,  requiring a decrease  in the one-period  nominal rate to maintain 
the real rate determined  by endowments  and preferences.  So  long  as 
the nominal rate is above zero, proportionality of prices and the money 
supply holds.  Now  suppose  that the money  supply is increased to the 
point that the expected rate of deflation equals the equilibrium real rate, 
implying  that the  nominal  rate is  zero.  Any  further increase  in  the 
money supply will simply be held as idle balances by individuals-they 
will be indifferent between bonds with a zero interest rate and money. 
This is a liquidity trap. In this flexible price world, however,  monetary 
policy has lost its ability to increase the price level,  as opposed to losing 
its ability to increase the level  of output in a Keynesian  world.  In this 
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rate whatever the central bank does.  But since the nominal interest rate 
cannot become  negative,  the economy  has a minimum rate of inflation, 
or a maximum rate of deflation. 
Krugman extends  the model  to include  production and,  to capture 
the idea of  sticky prices in a simple  way,  assumes  that the price level 
is fixed in the first period but is flexible thereafter. In this model,  outside 
the  trap increasing  the  money  supply  in  the  first period  lowers  the 
nominal and real rates together.  First period consumption  and produc- 
tion can  increase  if  the economy  is below  capacity.  But the limit  on 
downward movement  in the nominal rate limits  the amount of expan- 
sion; there is no guarantee that the monetary authority can maintain full 
employment. 
Under what conditions  is a liquidity  trap likely  to occur? One pos- 
sibility  is that people expect deflation,  so that even a zero nominal rate 
corresponds to a high real rate. Another possibility  is that the real rate 
corresponding  to  full  employment  is  itself  negative.  This  is  usually 
regarded as unlikely  but may be plausible  in Japan today,  with short- 
term forecasts  of an absolute output decline  and long-term forecasts of 
a decline  in labor force.  In Krugman's  model  this possibility  would 
follow  directly  from projected future declines  in per capita consump- 
tion,  so that the discounted  marginal utility  of consumption  is higher 
tomorrow than today.  It may seem less  likely that the full-employment 
real rate would be negative once the existence  of capital with a positive 
marginal product is recognized.  Krugman notes two reasons  why this 
does  not  eliminate  the  possibility.  One  is  the  importance  of  a  risk 
premium  on  capital.  The  interest  rate that is  constrained  to  be  non- 
negative  is a riskless  rate. With a risk premium of 5 percent, the econ- 
omy would be in a trap with an expected return on capital of 5 percent. 
Second,  capital  is  durable,  so  the  short-term return to  investment  in 
capital reflects  not only  its current marginal product but also  changes 
in its value.  He demonstrates  the possibility  that the decline  in value 
could  lead  to  a negative  real rate,  using  an overlapping  generations 
model  in which the labor force declines  over time,  an assumption that 
may be appropriate for a number of developed  countries besides Japan. 
For simplicity,  the model includes infinitely lived land as the productive 
asset,  but it is clear that a model with long-lived  capital would have the 
same characteristics. 
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of domestic investment at a zero interest rate is investment abroad. This 
appears to eliminate  the threat of a trap so long as returns are positive 
elsewhere.  While recognizing  that capital exports may help,  Krugman 
suggests  that the economics  of  capital  exports  is  not as favorable  as 
supposed.  He  notes  that capital  flows,  even  if they  succeed  in main- 
taining  a  positive  real  rate  measured  in  terms  of  tradables,  do  not 
prevent the real interest rate in terms of nontradables, or a consumption 
bundle  of  tradables  and  nontradables,  from  falling  below  zero.  He 
demonstrates  this possibility  in a model  in which  tradables and non- 
tradables are not perfect substitutes in consumption and prices are sticky 
in the nontraded goods  sector.  In this case,  a temporary monetary ex- 
pansion  will  lower  the nominal interest rate, with different effects  on 
the two sectors.  Since the real interest rate in tradables is tied down by 
world capital market equilibrium,  there must be deflation (in domestic 
currency)  of  traded goods  prices.  And  since  the future price  level  is 
tied down by future monetary policy,  the current price of tradables must 
rise through a nominal depreciation of the exchange  rate. The situation 
for nontradables,  however,  is  the  same  as in  a closed  economy;  the 
lower  nominal  rate will  normally  lower  the real rate,  and both con- 
sumption and production will  increase.  But just as in the closed  econ- 
omy,  even  if the interest rate is pushed to zero there may be less  than 
full employment;  the effect  of expansionary  policy  on the current ex- 
change rate is limited,  because  it is tied down by the future. 
The United States during the Great Depression  is the main historical 
example  of  an economy  with near zero nominal  rates and a sustained 
period of high unemployment,  and Krugman takes a closer look at what 
that experience reveals about liquidity trap economics.  He observes that 
how  one  interprets the  radical  difference  between  the  growth  of  the 
monetary base and broader aggregates  is crucial to whether one inter- 
prets the Depression  as a liquidity trap. The monetary base rose slightly 
at the start of the 1930s and then rose steeply throughout the remainder 
of the decade.  By  contrast,  M2 fell  by more than a third and did not 
surpass its 1929 level  until 1939. To analyze this differential behavior, 
Krugman augments his basic cash in advance model with intermediaries 
supplying inside money-deposits.  These deposits,  along with currency 
and bonds, can be traded by consumers in the capital market. Following 
Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig's  classic  paper on intermediaries, 
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versus  future consumption  at the time of  capital transactions,  but the 
uncertainty is resolved  by the time they go to the goods  markets. 
It is  this  idiosyncratic  uncertainty  that provides  a role  for banks. 
Even  though  consumers  are individually  uncertain about their use  of 
deposits,  withdrawals from banks are predictable because of the law of 
large numbers. Thus banks can invest some of their deposits in earning 
assets rather than reserves.  With positive interest rates, individuals hold 
no currency and banks hold just  the amount of  currency reserves  re- 
quired to satisfy  deposit  withdrawals,  investing  the balance in bonds. 
Krugman shows that this model replicates the results of his basic model. 
Increases  in cash,  now  the  monetary  base,  lead  to  proportionate  in- 
creases  in the current price level  and a reduction in the nominal rate. 
But if the nominal rate is driven to zero matters are more complicated. 
Consumers become  indifferent among holding currency, deposits,  and 
bonds, and banks become indifferent between holding currency reserves 
and bonds.  Exactly  where  an increase  in the  monetary  base  goes  in 
these  circumstances  is  indeterminate; only  in the case  in which  con- 
sumers substitute currency for bonds rather than for deposits  will there 
be any positive  effect  on a monetary aggregate consisting  of currency 
plus deposits.  Substitution of currency for deposits  by consumers will 
leave  the monetary  aggregates  unchanged,  as will  substitution  of  re- 
serves for bonds by banks.  In a liquidity  trap, not only  are prices and 
output beyond the reach of the monetary authority, but in addition there 
may be little evidence  of monetary expansion in the aggregates.  Expan- 
sion  of  the  monetary  base  is  consistent  with  decreases  in both  bank 
deposits  and credit.  Hence  the  model  helps  to  explain  the  monetary 
phenomena of the Great Depression. 
All the examples of policy  ineffectiveness  until this point have taken 
future monetary growth as given.  Krugman emphasizes  that in his styl- 
ized models  only temporary monetary expansions  are ineffective.  The 
central bank can get the economy  out of a trap if it can credibly promise 
a future rise in prices.  Since  proposing  future inflation as the solution 
to  an  economic  slump  is  novel,  Krugman discusses  some  potential 
criticisms.  For example,  he argues that inflation does not produce per- 
verse incentives  or misallocations  in a trap situation.  He also discusses 
extensively  the  "beggar  thy  neighbor"  character of  an  inflationary 
policy,  showing  that inflating one's  way out of a trap need not be more 
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etary policy  with  flexible  exchange  rates.  Utilizing  his  intertemporal 
framework with tradables and nontradables, Krugman constructs a beg- 
gar thy neighbor  coefficient  that measures  what fraction of  an output 
expansion  is an increase in the current account surplus. In the model, 
the coefficient  depends critically on preferences.  In the extreme case of 
log  utility,  a monetary expansion  has no effect  on an expanding  coun- 
try's current account.  Krugman computes the coefficient  for parameter 
values that reflect greater risk aversion and shows that the expansion of 
the current account  surplus relative  to growth  in GDP  may be much 
smaller than other observers have suggested. 
Having laid out the theoretical argument for the existence  of liquidity 
traps,  Krugman turns to  the  specifics  of  the  Japanese  situation.  He 
reports that as  of  his  writing,  money  market rates  were  at 43  basis 
points,  a very good approximation of a trap. How did this come about? 
Krugman judges  that if  the U.S.  personal  saving  rate jumped  to  the 
Japanese level  and monetary policy  were used in an attempt to maintain 
full employment,  interest rates would be pushed near zero. But in Japan 
the personal saving rate is slightly  lower than it was before  1990.  Thus 
the obvious  culprit is  a decline  in investment  demand,  and the most 
obvious  proximate cause is the decline  in output growth itself,  with its 
accelerator effect on investment.  But output growth is endogenous,  and 
Krugman identifies  the prospect  of  a declining  labor force  as a more 
fundamental factor depressing  current investment.  The Japanese labor 
force has peaked and is expected  to decline  by about 0.7  percent per 
year for the next thirty years. Since this shrinkage has been anticipated 
for  some  time,  it  remains  puzzling  that investment  did  not  weaken 
earlier.  Krugman suggests  that one reason may have been  the bubble 
economy  of the late  1980s. 
How  urgent is  the need  to restore growth  in Japan? If the dismal 
growth since  1991 were largely a decline in potential output, the payoff 
to finding an effective  policy  may not be great. Published estimates  of 
the gap between actual and potential GDP in 1997 are relatively modest. 
But Krugman is skeptical.  He notes,  for example,  that the International 
Monetary Fund's estimates  are based on a Hodrick-Prescott  filter that 
automatically reduces the estimate of potential GDP with any prolonged 
slump in actual output. In a protracted economic  slump,  this method- 
ology  would  eventually  interpret any prevailing  level  of  employment 
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in  the  interwar period  provides  a  stark illustration  of  this  defect:  it 
implies that U . S  . GDP returned to its potential by 1935. Unemployment 
was then 20 percent and annual real growth averaged almost 6 percent 
in the  subsequent  five  years.  The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and Development's  estimate  of a 1.2 percent gap in 1997 is 
based on a more elaborate technique but may have a similar bias because 
estimates  of  normal  hours  and productivity  commingle  cyclical  and 
secular  movements.  As  an alternative  way  to  estimate  output gaps, 
Krugman looks  at Okun's  Law.  He  finds that a Japanese version  fits 
surprisingly well for the period 1982-91.  If the average unemployment 
rate in the period  before  the  slump  is  taken as full  employment,  the 
implied output gap is 5 percent in 1997 and could approach 10 percent 
by the end of  1998.  He judges  that the output gap in  1998  will  be at 
least  8  percent,  and so  believes  that there  is  an enormous  return to 
finding a way out of the present liquidity trap. 
Some observers have suggested  that the troubled financial condition 
of  Japan's  banks  lies  behind  the  ineffectiveness  of  the central bank. 
While  he agrees that disruption of intermediation has played  a crucial 
role in many crises,  including  the current crises  in the emerging  econ- 
omies  of Asia,  Krugman is not persuaded that banking problems have 
been central to Japan's current difficulties.  He notes that Japan has not 
suffered  any widespread  run by depositors  that would  force the liqui- 
dation  of  loans.  Furthermore, he  notes  that in the absence  of  a run, 
banks in trouble would be expected to overlend on risky projects rather 
than to restrict credit,  a bias seen among U.S.  thrifts before the regu- 
latory crackdown in the savings  and loan crisis.  Moreover,  he reports 
that nonbank subsidiaries of Japanese financial institutions grew rapidly 
in  1990-91,  even  as asset  deflation  was  underway,  and that a credit 
squeeze only became apparent in 1998, after capital adequacy standards 
were  tightened.  Thus  Krugman argues that the credit crunch did not 
appear when banks were getting into trouble, but when it was clear that 
the  government  was  likely  to  do  something  about  it.  The  fact  that 
cleaning  up the financial system may temporarily weaken bank lending 
and the economy  is not, in his view,  a reason for delay.  For microeco- 
nomic  reasons,  he judges  that "the  most important thing is to get on 
with the job and get it over with." 
But Krugman believes  that even if the banking system is cleaned up 
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political  and economic  reasons,  that fiscal  policy  is up to the task of 
pulling  the economy  out of  its slump.  He is skeptical  of the multiple 
equilibria view that a temporary stimulus can "jump start" the economy 
to a favorable  equilibrium and is wary of the long-run economic  con- 
sequences  of running a sustained deficit large enough to close  the cur- 
rent output gap.  Therefore  Krugman thinks it essential  to reestablish 
effective  monetary policy.  And  his  analysis  suggests  an unorthodox 
solution:  a credible commitment  to future inflation.  If expected  future 
inflation can be raised sufficiently,  the real rate of interest can fall to 
the level  required to increase output, even  with nominal interest rates 
near zero.  How high would expected  inflation have to be,  and for how 
long  would it need to maintained? Based on plausible  estimates  of the 
elasticity  of demand with respect to real interest rates, the size  of the 
output  gap,  and the  permanence  of  the  demand  shortfall,  Krugman 
speculates  that a commitment  to about 4 percent  annual inflation  for 
fifteen years is needed.  While Krugman does not take this number too 
seriously,  he is convinced  that the liquidity trap is neither an historical 
myth nor a modern irrelevancy.  Not only has it appeared in Japan, but 
he suggests  that it could also happen elsewhere,  and he urges research 
to better understand the phenomenon  and provide effective  cures. 
RAPID  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  and  improving  living  standards have 
benefited almost all regions since the industrial revolution.  Sub-Saharan 
Africa (hereafter Africa) stands out as the one exception.  Estimates by 
Angus Maddison show that relative to the richest regions of the world, 
the per capita GDP of Africa has fallen from one-third in 1820 to one- 
twentieth  today.  Some  had hoped  that economic  performance  would 
improve once these nations emerged from colonial  rule. Instead, it has 
grown worse.  African per capita income declined by 1.2 percent a year 
during the 1980s and by 0.9  percent a year between  1990 and 1996.  In 
the third article of this issue,  David Bloom  and Jeffrey Sachs  analyze 
this  dismal  economic  performance.  While  they  recognize  the  impor- 
tance of a range of political,  social,  and external factors that have been 
identified as contributing to Africa's  poverty,  they focus  on its highly 
disadvantageous  economic  geography.  They  believe  this  lies  behind 
many other proximate causes of the region's  poor performance and that 
an understanding of geography's  role is key to formulating policies  to 
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Most of Africa lies in the tropical zone.  Bloom and Sachs begin with 
a general comparison of economic  development  in tropical and temper- 
ate  regions  and  an  extensive  discussion  of  Africa's  particular geo- 
graphic characteristics.  Tropical economies  average only one-third the 
GDP  per  capita  of  nontropical  economies.  Similar  disparities  exist 
within  countries  such as Australia and Brazil that straddle the tropics 
and temperate zones,  and also  within  the African  continent:  tropical 
sub-Saharan Africa averages only one-quarter the per capita income of 
South Africa. The authors hypothesize that the income gap of the tropics 
reflects three forces: endogenous  technical change that is biased toward 
the large markets of  the temperate zones,  where most of  the world's 
population is located; inherent difficulties  in diffusing technical change 
across ecological  zones,  as seen  in the way  technologies  spread from 
the populous  temperate  north to  the  temperate  regions  of  the  south, 
skipping  the tropics;  and problems  in agriculture and health that are 
inherent to the tropics. 
Successful  agriculture requires the right growing  conditions.  While 
the tropical latitudes are generally characterized by high sea-level  tem- 
peratures and twelve  hours of  daylight  throughout the year,  in other 
respects climatic and ecological  conditions vary widely.  Within Africa, 
year-round rainfall in a 100 latitude band around the equator produces 
tropical rainforests.  On either side of this band, alternating wet and dry 
seasons produce grasslands that cover roughly 60 percent of the African 
continent,  generally  drier the further from the equator. Beyond the 20? 
latitudes,  the climate  is so arid that it produces desserts.  Within these 
general parameters, land at high altitudes receives  more rain than land 
at sea level,  leading  to a concentration of population  in the highlands 
of regions  such as East Africa.  Compared with other tropical regions, 
Africa  has a large land mass  whose  temperature is not moderated by 
the ocean.  And except  for a part of West Africa,  it lacks the monsoon 
effects  that provide rainfall in parts of Asia.  As a consequence,  much 
of Africa is at risk of drought. 
In addition to these broad climatic  disadvantages,  Bloom  and Sachs 
describe a host of botanical considerations  that limit the crops that can 
be grown  in much of  Africa  and account for the observed  patterns of 
food production. Agriculture is relatively  successful  in the East African 
highlands,  but these  areas are isolated  from internal and international William  C. Brainard  and George L. Perry  xxix 
trade. Large parts of equatorial West Africa are rainforest zones  amen- 
able to only  a few  cash  crops,  such as cocoa.  The more arid regions 
outside the equatorial zone can produce little,  and some woodland areas 
that might otherwise  be reasonably productive  suffer from pests,  poor 
soils,  and high temperatures. 
Health is another great handicap to economic  development.  The au- 
thors report that even  after controlling  for per capita  income  levels, 
tropical populations have lower life expectancies  at birth than temperate 
zone populations; and health conditions  in Africa are especially  poor in 
comparison  with the rest of the tropics.  In Africa,  43 percent of disa- 
bility-adjusted life years are caused by infectious and parasitic diseases, 
compared with 29 percent in India and 3 percent in Europe. 
To illustrate the core health issues  for the region,  Bloom  and Sachs 
examine  the transmission  of malaria and HIV/AIDS.  The capacity  for 
the spread of  malaria depends  on the longevity  of  the mosquito  host 
relative  to the latency  period of the disease  within the mosquito.  The 
latency  period  is  shorter the hotter the  ambient temperature,  so  that 
malaria spreads rapidly in the tropics and is absent from cool  climates. 
This, together with the fact that the mosquito that most readily transmits 
the disease  is indigenous,  is the reason malaria continues to be a major 
problem in Africa  even  though it has been  largely  eradicated in most 
parts of the world.  The authors cite estimates  that the costs  of medical 
care and lost productivity due to malaria were 1 percent of African GDP 
in  1995.  They  conjecture  that the  total  costs  of  malaria in  terms of 
retarding economic  development  far exceed these direct costs,  since the 
disease  inhibits foreign  investment  and tourism. 
Bloom  and Sachs  judge  HIV/AIDS  an even  more daunting health 
problem than malaria for  Africa's  economic  future.  Among  HIV-in- 
fected people in the world,  six out of ten men, eight out of ten women, 
and nine out of ten children live  in Africa.  Many children are infected 
at birth, others are infected as infants through breastfeeding; and those 
orphaned by the disease  face  bleak  economic  and social  futures.  Al- 
though it is difficult to link the AIDS epidemic to geography, the authors 
identify a number of social and economic  characteristics that contribute 
to  its  spread in Africa.  And the toll  from the disease  is  rising:  over 
4  million  Africans  died  of  AIDS  from  1985  to  1995  and  nearly 
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Bloom and Sachs point to transportation difficulties  as another major 
disadvantage  for  African  development.  They  identify  several  geo- 
graphic features that contribute to these difficulties: large distances from 
major world markets; separation from Europe by the vast Sahara desert, 
which is larger than the continental United States; a short coastline relative 
to land area; few  natural ports along the coastline; populations that are 
generally located far from the coast; the highest proportions of landlocked 
states and of population within landlocked states of any continent; and the 
absence of rivers into the interior that are navigable by ocean-going ves- 
sels. The authors report earlier research showing that high coastal density 
supports economic  growth by facilitating the division of labor and other 
benefits of trade. Only 19 percent of Africa's population lives within 100 
km of the coast, and only a few percent more live near navigable rivers. 
This compares with 67 percent of the U.S.  population and 89 percent of 
Europe's population living near the coast or navigable rivers. 
Bloom  and Sachs  also  discuss  a variety  of  demographic  features, 
often reflecting geographic  factors,  that contribute to Africa's  poverty. 
Because  of  the dependence  on  low-productivity  agriculture,  only  31 
percent of the population live in urban centers. Low population densities 
and rates of urbanization,  in turn, make it expensive  to provide infra- 
structure services.  Finally,  despite its significant health problems,  Af- 
rica has experienced  high fertility rates alongside  declining  youth mor- 
tality  rates,  which  together  have  resulted  in  a swelling  of  the  youth 
cohort  and an increase  in the ratio of  the dependent  to  working-age 
populations.  The  authors see  the high  dependency  ratio as  a further 
impediment  to  growth  through  the  burden it  places  on  the  region's 
limited education resources  and through other channels. 
To  test  their  ideas  about  the  sources  of  Africa's  poor  economic 
growth,  Bloom  and Sachs turn to cross-country regressions,  using data 
for seventy-three African and non-African countries from 1965 to 1990. 
They  explain  the  growth  rate of  GDP  per capita  using  two  kinds  of 
variable: first, standard variables from the growth literature, including 
fiscal measures,  openness  to trade, the quality of institutions,  liquidity 
measures,  educational  attainment,  and  initial  GDP  per  worker;  and 
second,  additional  variables  related  to  demography,  geography,  and 
health.  These  additional variables  are the fraction of  land area that is 
in the tropics,  population  densities  near to and away from the coast, 
life  expectancy,  the  proportion of  land  in  the  tropics,  the  length  of William  C. Brainard and George L. Perry  xxxi 
coastline relative to land area, growth rates of the working-age and total 
populations,  and an African dummy. 
The authors find considerable  support for their analysis  of Africa's 
problems.  When only the African dummy is used along with the stan- 
dard variables,  it indicates that per capita GDP grew about 2 percent a 
year slower  in African nations,  other things equal.  But controlling  for 
their additional variables-age  structure, life expectancy,  the percent- 
age  of  land  in  the tropics,  and the  ratio of  coastline  to  land  area- 
eliminates the significance of the African dummy and substantially im- 
proves the fit of the regressions, indicating that the authors' variables help 
to capture the factors underlying growth in Africa and elsewhere.  When 
the eighteen African and fifty-five non-African countries in the sample are 
considered as separate groups, the results cannot reject the hypothesis of 
common regression coefficients for both. The results also suggest that the 
African disadvantage does not arise from social characteristics or stocks 
of social capital, as some previous researchers have surmised. 
Bloom and Sachs use their regression estimates to explain the growth 
differential  between Africa and other parts of the world between  1965 
and 1990.  Over this period,  Africa grew 4.3  percentage points slower 
than East and Southeast Asia,  2.1  percentage points slower than Latin 
America,  and 3.6  percentage points  slower  than the world generally. 
Differences  in age structure, geography,  and health collectively  account 
for  63  percent,  101  percent,  and 78  percent,  respectively,  of  these 
growth gaps between Africa and other regions.  Among  the traditional 
variables,  openness  is by far the most important in accounting  for the 
growth gaps.  This supports the idea that the attempts by most postin- 
dependence African governments  to industrialize  through import sub- 
stitution failed badly. 
Given the geographic  and demographic factors that they identify  as 
underlying Africa's problem of poverty, Bloom and Sachs discuss what 
growth strategies might be helpful.  They start by seeking  lessons  from 
successful  tropical economies.  Within Africa only  Botswana,  with its 
unique diamond resources, and the island nation of Mauritius are in this 
category.  Outside the African region,  six  tropical countries  averaged 
per capita GDP growth greater than 3 percent a year during 1965-96: 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia,  Sri Lanka, Singapore,  and Thailand. 
The  authors draw on  the  extensive  literature on  these  economies  to 
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The authors find that an industrial policy  aimed at promoting  man- 
ufacturing  exports  has been  at the core  of  the growth  strategy of  all 
successful  tropical economies.  In many cases,  expansion  in these  sec- 
tors permitted diversification  of  production  away  from tropical  com- 
modities  that faced  limited  demand growth  and little  opportunity for 
technical progress. In implementing such growth strategies, these Asian 
economies  attracted multinational  firms with a variety of  institutional 
accommodations,  including  tax-sheltered  export  processing  zones, 
concessions  on duties and on export-oriented  foreign  investment,  and 
other measures designed  to attract export-oriented  industries. 
Bloom  and Sachs believe  many African nations will  have problems 
establishing manufacturing export sectors. Because most manufacturing 
in emerging  economies  relies  heavily  on imported intermediate prod- 
ucts,  the inland economies  are at a transport cost disadvantage and will 
need to concentrate on adding value to locally  produced commodities, 
such as coffee  or cotton.  And even  the coastal  economies  must over- 
come  a number of  problems.  Here the authors identify  poor port ser- 
vices,  unreliable power,  abusive customs  agents,  and disadvantageous 
tax  laws  as  barriers to  duplicating  the  success  of  other  developing 
nations. While they acknowledge  that the reasons for these barriers and 
for Africa's  lack of manufacturing competitiveness  more generally  are 
not well understood, they are critical of the advice that the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank have provided on this matter. They 
argue that loan programs have been  ambivalent  about,  if not outright 
opposed  to,  the  establishment  of  export  processing  zones  and tax 
concessions  aimed  at  attracting export-oriented  manufacturers,  both 
features of Asian nations'  success. 
Bloom  and Sachs  warn that Africa  poses  a complex  development 
challenge  and  that many  of  the  factors  that have  contributed  to  its 
impoverishment over the years are not easily  changed.  While they sup- 
port a major commitment  to  the  development  of  manufacturing,  the 
fundamental handicaps  confronting  the region  also  lead them to rec- 
ommend  actions  well  beyond  economists'  usual policy  prescriptions. 
They  note that current scientific  efforts  to solve  Africa's  health,  agri- 
cultural, and environmental problems are woefully  inadequate and urge 
that aid programs redirect resources to these less conventional  but cur- 
rently crucial activities.  And they conclude that shifting the orientation 
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raphy, demography,  and health constitutes a necessary  step in devising 
more effective  approaches to Africa's  development  challenges. 
As  UNEMPLOYMENT  FELL  to 6 percent during  1994,  most  analysts 
were already warning that the U.S.  economy  had reached its NAIRU- 
the unemployment  rate at which inflation remains stable.  According  to 
the  NAIRU  model,  if  policymakers  permitted unemployment  to  fall 
further, rising inflation would eventually  require a painful recession  to 
bring  it under control.  Four years  later,  economic  expansion  has re- 
duced  the unemployment  rate to 4V/2 percent,  and the broad price  in- 
dexes  show  the lowest  inflation rates in more than thirty years.  This 
performance  has increased  criticism  of  the NAIRU  framework by  its 
detractors and intensified  its supporters' efforts to interpret recent de- 
velopments  within  the framework.  In the second  report of this issue, 
Robert Gordon,  who has used a NAIRU  model to explain  inflation for 
the past two  decades,  provides  a detailed  interpretation of  recent de- 
velopments.  He examines  the economy's  price performance,  allowing 
for special  factors that have impacted the major price indexes,  and for 
the possibility  that the NAIRU has recently declined. 
Gordon's econometric estimates incorporate three main determinants 
of inflation: First, either negative or positive  levels  of excess  aggregate 
demand,  measured by the gap between  the actual unemployment  rate 
and the NAIRU.  Second,  supply  shocks,  measured by changes  in the 
relative price of imports and the relative price of food and energy.  And 
third, the effects  of past inflation on current price-setting,  measured by 
lags of past inflation rates. By assuming that the sum of coefficients  on 
the  lagged  inflation rates equals  unity,  which  Gordon  finds approxi- 
mately consistent  with freely estimated coefficient  values,  the inflation 
equation provides an estimate of the NAIRU. 
Until recently,  Gordon had found that assuming  a constant NAIRU 
provided  an adequate fit to the data. However,  such an equation  sub- 
stantially overpredicts price inflation in recent quarters. To explore this 
favorable recent experience,  Gordon allows  for the possibility  that the 
NAIRU  varies with time,  using an estimating  technique developed  by 
James Stock and Mark Watson.  In regressions  for each of three broad 
price  measures-the  GDP deflator,  the personal  consumption  expen- 
diture deflator, and the Consumer Price Index-the  time paths for the 
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all  have  declined  substantially,  from  around 6?/4 percent  in  the  late 
1980s  to between  5.3  and 5.7  percent in mid-1998.  While part of this 
decline  is left  unexplained,  another part is explained  by three factors 
that have  held  down  measured price  indexes  in this period,  and thus 
reduced the estimated NAIRUs  using Gordon's framework: rapid qual- 
ity improvements  in computers,  an abrupt slowdown  in medical  care 
inflation,  and changes  in the  methodology  used  to  calculate  price 
indexes. 
The estimated  declines  in NAIRUs  have still  left  actual unemploy- 
ment rates well  below  the NAIRU  for the past two to three years,  yet 
price inflation is stable or declining  by all three measures.  According 
to Gordon,  one reason is that supply shocks explain  an important part 
of  recent  price  performance.  Allowing  for  their  effects  reduces  the 
amount of favorable price surprise left to be accounted for by a declin- 
ing  NAIRU.  Gordon  notes  that his  estimating  technique  employs  a 
smoothing  parameter to control  how  abruptly the estimated  NAIRUs 
change,  and his results are sensitive  to the value chosen  for this para- 
meter.  His  preferred  estimates  allow  only  gradual  changes  in the 
NAIRU.  Permitting more rapid changes would yield lower estimates of 
the current NAIRU  and explain more of the favorable inflation surprise 
at the end of the period,  but at the cost of permitting more abrupt, and 
seemingly  unrealistic,  changes  in earlier years. 
Gordon quantifies the amount of the inflation surprise for the GDP 
deflator for  1998:2  that can be accounted  for by each of the develop- 
ments he identifies.  He measures the inflation surprise as the prediction 
error from  an  equation  estimated  through  1992:4,  with  a  constant 
6  percent  NAIRU  and with  the  relative  price  of  imports,  food,  and 
energy  held  constant.  All  results  refer to the four quarters ending  in 
1998:2,  when the deflator rose by 1.0 percentage point, or 2.7  percent- 
age  points  higher  than predicted.  Of  this  surprise,  Gordon's  supply 
shocks-the  relative  price  declines  in  food,  energy,  and  imports- 
explain  1.4  points.  The estimated  decline  of the NAIRU  accounts  for 
0.5 point, with about half of the decline unexplained and half accounted 
for by the special  factors-quality  improvement,  medical  care costs, 
and methodology-that  held down the price indexes.  Finally,  0.8  point 
of  the  inflation  surprise  is  left  unexplained.  Gordon  notes  that this 
allocation  of  the inflation  surprise is  sensitive  to how  he treats these 
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tracted 0.74  point from the inflation rate in the GDP deflator, though 
they account for only 0.25  point of the inflation surprise through their 
estimated lowering  of the NAIRU  in the decomposition  above. 
Unemployment  is an imperfect proxy for aggregate excess  demand 
and many observers look to the behavior of wages  as well  as prices to 
understand the inflation process.  When Gordon expands his analysis to 
address these two issues,  he finds important differences  from the results 
using his basic model.  Capacity utilization  (in manufacturing, mining, 
and utilities)  has not risen in pace with the decline  in unemployment, 
and actual utilization  has been below  the estimated noninflationary uti- 
lization  rate in recent years.  When he substitutes  capacity  utilization 
for unemployment  as the demand measure in his  model,  he estimates 
little  change  in this noninflationary rate. Unfortunately,  there is little 
statistical basis for choosing  between  unemployment  and capacity uti- 
lization  as reliable  indicators of inflationary pressures. 
Broad  measures  of  hourly  labor costs  have  not  decelerated  along 
with the major price indexes  in recent years. The annual increase in the 
Employment  Cost Index (ECI) for total compensation  barely changed 
over this period,  as the cost of medical fringe benefits slowed.  The ECI 
for wages  and salaries,  the most reliable  gauge  of wage  inflation,  ac- 
tually accelerated,  rising 3.9  percent in the year ending  1998:2,  com- 
pared with 3. 1 percent four years earlier. As a consequence,  rather than 
declining  after the late  1980s,  as have each of the NAIRUs  estimated 
from price data, the NAIRU  estimated for ECI wages  and salaries has 
risen to around 6/2  percent. 
Although Gordon accounts for most of the surprise in price inflation 
in recent years through a declining  NAIRU,  supply shocks,  and special 
factors,  some  of the inflation slowdown  remains to be accounted  for. 
But  Gordon  is  not  persuaded  by  other  explanations  that have  been 
offered.  He questions  the "new  economy"  view  that unmeasured ef- 
fects of high-technology  innovation have held down inflation. He notes 
that such  effects  should  have  boosted  measured  productivity  by  the 
same amount as they held down  measured inflation,  but no such pro- 
ductivity  surprise is in the data. He also  notes  that the argument that 
official  price indexes  miss  some  of  the benefits  of  innovation  cannot 
explain the surprising deceleration  in those official  indexes. 
Gordon's analysis provides a helpful decomposition  of recent infla- 
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the different NAIRUs  estimated for wages  and prices and to the differ- 
ent estimates provided by unemployment and capacity utilization as the 
two  main puzzles.  The different NAIRUs  for wages  and prices  imply 
continually  accelerating  wages  alongside  continually  decelerating 
prices whenever unemployment  is between the two.  He does not get rid 
of  this  puzzle  by  modifying  his  price  model  to  include  wage  costs, 
because  he  finds little  role  for wage  costs  as a separate factor in ex- 
plaining  price  inflation.  If the unemployment  rate is  to be  a reliable 
guide  for  stabilization  policy,  many  of  the  questions  that Gordon's 
analysis  raises will  need better answers than are now available. 
THE  JAPANESE  ECONOMY  has  been  in  a  slump  throughout  the 
1990s.  In recent quarters, following  two aborted spurts of recovery,  the 
situation  has deteriorated from a growth recession  to a steep  decline 
that has  also  contributed  to  recessions  and financial  crises  in  other 
Pacific  Rim economies.  Japan's  macroeconomic  problems  have been 
accompanied  by  sharp drops  in  real  estate  values  and stock  prices, 
which  have  eroded  the capital  position  of  its  banks.  These  financial 
problems  have  intensified  with  the continuing  declines  in production 
and employment  and threaten the macroeconomy  with a credit crunch, 
on top of the weakness  in aggregate demand.  Observers in the United 
States and elsewhere  have been frustrated and baffled by the inadequate 
response  of  Japanese  officials  to  these  substantial  problems.  In  the 
second  report in this issue,  Edward Lincoln  provides  a historical  per- 
spective  on the Japanese financial system and relates it to the origins of 
the present crisis  and the prospects for the Japanese economy. 
Analysts  accustomed  to  the  institutional  frameworks  of  other  ad- 
vanced industrial nations have had trouble understanding the workings 
of the Japanese banking system and the paralysis of officials  in dealing 
with the banking crisis.  Lincoln sees the origins of the present problem 
in the design  of  the  postwar  financial  system,  which  was  part of  an 
overall plan that gave government unusual power to guide the economy. 
That design minimized the role of stock and bond markets, which would 
have responded to market forces  to allocate  capital,  and relied instead 
on banks and insurance companies  that could readily be influenced by 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In exchange  for protected markets and 
almost assured profitability, these industries became vehicles  for credit 
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Lincoln observes  that the central position  assigned to bank lending, 
which depended on personal relationships  and confidential rather than 
public information flows,  was well  suited to the way Japanese society 
worked.  It also  came  to  complement  the  keiretsu  (enterprise  group) 
relationships around which most industrial activity was organized,  with 
"main banks"  providing corporate oversight.  In the high-growth years 
of the early postwar period,  this bank-centered system  did a good job 
of matching savers with investors  in Japan, although it led to danger- 
ously  high  debt-to-equity  ratios  throughout the  corporate  sector  and 
especially  in banking.  Lincoln  argues that the combination  of interna- 
tional capital controls,  the government's  willingness  to defend the cur- 
rency,  and the absence  of  other countries  pursuing the same  strategy 
shielded  Japan during this period from the kinds of  serious  problems 
that recently befell  South Korea.  But,  in his analysis,  when economic 
growth slowed  after 1973,  the environment for bank lending gradually 
changed,  sowing  the seeds of the crisis of the 1990s. 
Slower  growth  led  to  a chronic  excess  of  desired  saving  over  do- 
mestic  investment  and rising  pressure  for  deregulation  from  banks, 
which needed to broaden their activities  to maintain profitability. In the 
1980s,  accommodated  by the MOF's regulatory changes,  banks signi- 
ficantly expanded their activities in real estate and international lending. 
Lincoln reports that total bank lending grew a little faster in this decade 
than in the last half of the  1970s,  with the growth concentrated in the 
two new  areas. By the second  half of the  1980s,  lending  to manufac- 
turing was stagnant. He notes that the new areas of lending were much 
riskier than the banks'  traditional business,  in part because  the banks 
were  in unfamiliar  markets and continued  to rely  on  strong personal 
relationships without paying adequate attention to financial analysis.  In 
addition,  having  prospered  in  an environment  sheltered  from  entry, 
Japanese banks continued to believe  in an implicit  guarantee of profit 
from the MOF. Their complacency  was encouraged by the continuing 
large inflow of funds from the public and by their own high profits. 
The enormous appreciation of the yen that began in 1985 eventually 
led the MOF to ease  monetary policy,  a move  that avoided  recession 
and maintained  rapid real growth.  But  Lincoln  notes  that with  little 
demand for loans  to manufacturing firms,  lending  for real estate  and 
stock market investments soared. Both stock prices and urban real estate 
prices tripled in a few  years and banks used inflated real estate values xxxviii  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
as collateral for a wide range of loans.  When the bubbles in stocks and 
real estate  finally  burst,  prices  crashed back  to  1985  levels,  leaving 
mountains of bad debts in their wake. 
The  size  of  the bad debt problem  is  notoriously  hard to pin down 
because  of the lax reporting requirements for banks in Japan. Lincoln 
reports that MOF estimates  escalated  from  Y28  trillion in fall  1997 to 
Y77  trillion a few months later, and that in summer 1998 the Financial 
Supervisory  Agency,  which  was  spun off  from the MOF,  revised  up 
the total to  Y 123. This last estimate,  about one-quarter of which com- 
prises loans that have already been declared bad, amounts to 25 percent 
of GDP. The losses  of insurance companies  and securities firms are not 
included in these figures. 
Perhaps more disturbing than the size  of  the bad debt problem are 
the examples  of unethical  and illegal  behavior in the financial system. 
Lincoln  notes that favored investors,  including politicians  and bureau- 
crats, were assured high returns on their equity investments.  Huge loans 
went to small business  for speculation  in stocks  and real estate.  Cor- 
porations  paid  off  racketeers  who  threatened to  reveal  embarrassing 
information.  MOF officials  warned banks of upcoming  "surprise"  in- 
spections  and performed only  perfunctory examinations.  In Lincoln's 
words,  such "scandals  paint a picture of widespread routine corruption 
and incestuous  relations  among  financial  firms,  their clients,  govern- 
ment officials,  and politicians." 
If the banking crisis reflected unexpected shocks to a well-functioning 
system,  a policy  aimed solely  at clearing up balance sheets would seem 
appropriate. But in light of the scandals he identifies,  Lincoln  argues 
that harsh remedies  are needed:  closing  institutions  or,  for those  that 
appear salvageable,  removing  management.  He  further observes  that 
progress has been difficult because of the complicity  of the Ministry of 
Finance,  "condoning,  encouraging,  or even  recommending  unethical 
and illegal  actions,"  and the resistance of politically  powerful business 
leaders who have benefited from the present system  and fear change. 
The  government's  response  to  both  the  economic  slump  and the 
banking problem has included  fiscal  stimulus,  along with some  direct 
efforts  to bail  out troubled banks.  Seven  stimulus  packages  were  an- 
nounced  between  1992  and  1995,  although  "the  amount of  stimulus 
actually  provided  was  considerably  less  than originally  announced." 
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ment's  fiscal  balance,  and some  merely  supplement  an initial  budget 
that may have been very restrictive.  Using  estimates  by Adam Posen, 
Lincoln  shows  that announced  stimulus  packages  over this period to- 
taled  12 percent of  GDP,  whereas  the ex  post actual stimulus  totaled 
only one-third that amount. Still,  Lincoln regards this stimulus as mean- 
ingful  and credits it with helping  the economy  to recover briefly.  But 
he notes that fiscal policy  was perversely tightened in early 1997,  when 
an income  tax cut was  allowed  to expire  and the nationwide  sales  tax 
was  raised.  The  economic  slump  has  deepened  sharply  since  then, 
exacerbating the banking crisis. 
The government's  latest plan to deal with the crisis was unveiled  in 
the summer of  1998.  It created a secondary market for securitized bad 
loans,  tightened  accounting  rules,  created the  Financial  Supervisory 
Agency  as a split-off  from the MOF to  strengthen bank supervision, 
and most important, established  a "bridge  bank"  system  for handling 
failed banks.  Under that system,  if an acquisition  cannot be arranged 
for  a  failed  bank,  it  will  become  a  bridge  bank  under government 
control.  It will  receive  new capital from the government  and can con- 
tinue to make loans to "sound"  borrowers,  dispose  of bad loans,  and 
seek buyers for its remaining assets.  Lincoln  applauds this new initia- 
tive but also points to potential problems with its implementation.  First, 
because the concept of a failed bank is ill defined,  it is unclear whether 
the plan will actually eliminate irresponsible institutions and their man- 
agers rather than keeping existing  institutions afloat. Second,  in allow- 
ing the continuation of sound loans,  the new program may maintain the 
flow of credit to traditional borrowers who are not creditworthy,  espe- 
cially  if they  are politically  well  connected.  Third,  the timetable  for 
shutting down  failed  banks is uncertain,  suggesting  that the program 
may be used to delay needed restructuring. 
Lincoln discusses  other recent developments  that he regards as pos- 
itive for the longer run. Firms are issuing more bonds,  which indicates 
that the financial system  is starting to move  away from excessive  reli- 
ance on loan finance.  And the government  appears to be overcoming 
its antipathy toward foreign firms, welcoming  them into the market for 
securitized bad debt and permitting them to acquire equity interests in 
Japanese financial firms. However,  Lincoln remains guarded about the 
immediate future, concluding  that the problems of the Japanese econ- 
omy and financial system  are far from over. 